THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, WITH SOME
REMARKS ON OTHER UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
LAWS.*
Though the purpose of the Conference of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws in recommending for enactment a draft
Partnership Act, is to secure uniformity in the laws of the several States on that subject, the possible arguments for or against
the enactment of this and other legislation on commercial topics,
which have been endorsed by the Conference, may take a wider
range than a discussion of the desirability of uniformity of State
laws. Indeed, presumably no one would be so bold as to deny
that such uniformity is in itself a desirable thing, and opponents
or doubters must base their opposition or doubts either on the
ground that even a good codification of the subject is undesirable
or that the Act in question is not a good codification. One who
advocates the enactment of this legislation must be prepared,
therefore, to consider not simpiy or indeed chiefly the advisability
of uniformity, but also whether there are possible counterbalancing disadvantages in seeking to obtain uniformity by the proposed
statute.
In the first place, then, one who advises the enactment of so
considerable a law as the Partnership Act, which is itself only
one of several codifications of portions of the commercial law
which the Conference of Commissioners has proposed for enactment, must be prepared to consider what objection there may be
to reducing to the form of a code, or statute, considerable tracts
of the law which have been previously controlled only by the

common law.
Codification has an ugly sound to most American lawyers.
We have been trained to believe that no code can be expressed
with sufficient exactness, or can be sufficiently elastic to fulfil
adequately the functions of our common law. The -iridescent
legal utopia proposed by Bentham and his followers, in which
every one should readily know the law, or be able quickly to find
*Address delivered before the Law Association of Philadelphia on December 18, 1914.
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it by turning to a code, and in which the professional lawyer
would be abolished, has been proved a dream. We know, today,
that law must adapt itself to changing conditions; that what is
right in one time and place is not necessarily universal truth;
that so long as the skein of human affairs is full of difficult
tangles the law controlling those affairs cannot be simple, or
understood easily by uninstructed persons; that much of our law
is in too vague a form to be written down; that new -cases may
arise tomorrow for which the common law will find an answerthough neither the question nor the answer could be suggested
by one who framed a code today.
The instinctively hostile attitude of American lawyers has
been made more pronounced by the inadequacy of the attempts
in the United States to draft elaborate codes. Especially the
ambitious project of David Dudley Field to codify the law of
New York has served as a warning. The crushing arguments
and proofs adduced by James C. Carter, and others, showed the
inadequacy of Field's proposed draft of a civil code, and prevented its enactment by the legislature of New York-though it
was afterwards adopted by California and has been influential
in the legislation of other States of the far west.
It must not be forgotten, however, in any criticism of codification, that practically the whole civilized world, except Englishspeaking countries, is governed by codes; that these codes have
been adopted chiefly during the past century after trial of systems
of unwritten or customary law; and that foreign expert opinion
seems practically unanimous in favor of codification. We are,
therefore, driven to believe that there is nothing chimerical in the
plan of codification itself, but that if it has serious disadvantages
in English-speaking countries they must be due either to
(i) The inferior workmanship of the codes which have
actually been produced or,
(2) To the greater vagueness or rapidity of the growth of
the law -of English-speaking countries which makes adequate
codification impracticable.
The first of these evils should be remediable if time, patience,
hard work, and learning, can be combined to meet them. The
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second objection, if applicable to parts of our law, cannot be true
of many other parts, including such parts of the commercial law
as the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws have attempted to
codify. The law of these subjects is in the main crystalized.and,
indeed, is so far fixed in its main points by numerous judicial
decisions that it is practically impossible to change it without
legislation.
It cannot be admitted then that there is any inherent difficulty in codifying these portions of the law, other than the difficulty confessedly great, of clear, concise, and accurate statement.
If further proof of this were needed, it may be found in experience. Parts of our law have already been-codified. Criminal law
had a long development as customary law. Few would deny that
it has been advantageous to codify it, as has for the most part
been done. Other examples perhaps less striking, but sufficiently
convincing, might easily be given of the successful codification of
rules of law which had their development as part of the common
law.A difficulty in regard to even partial codification which
troubles many is the lack of elasticity which statute law has as
compared with the common law. That this objection is wholly.
without force need not be contended, but it may easily be overemphasized in regard to such codification of such matters as are
here under discussion. The main principles of these subjects have
already become inelastic in the common law. They could no more
easily be changed than could a statute itself, except by legislation.
W-hat may be called the fringe of the subject is doubtless open
to possible development and growth at common law, but this
possibility still remains for all the uniform statutes provide that
as to matters not specifically covered by the Act, the rules of common law and equity are applicable.
As to points specifically covered by the Act, if a change is
found desirable, experience shows that it is perhaps not more
difficult to get a legislature to amend a statute than to get a court
to overrule a previous decision.
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But though such rules of law may be fixed both in Pennsylvania and in New York, for instance, it does not follow that the
same rule is established in both States.
The advantages of codifying such portions of the law are:
i. To produce uniformity of law;
2. To state the law in a compendious form in which it will
be susceptible of easier reference and more exact determination
than if sought from decisions;
3. To settle uncertain questions of law without legislation.
Even in so old a State as Pennsylvania there are doubtless questions which would be settled by the enactment of the Uniform
Partnership Act, or of the Uniform Sales Act, which could now
be determined only by litigation. Legislation is cheaper than
litigation as a means of fixing the law in these particulars. In
the newer States this advantage is entitled to the greatest weight;
4. To harmonize into a more consistent whole a body of
doctrines, many of which have grown up, if not at haphazard, at
-least without particular reference to one another.
In the partial codification of certain subjects attempted by
the Commissioners on Uniform Laws the first of these advantages has been the only one directly sought; but in support of
their acts the Commissioners may fairly urge whatever incidental
advantages may be derived from uniform codification of the
subjects in question.
It is not always understood to how great an extent the
unification of a variety of customary laws prevailing in a given
country has been a dominant motive for codification. The
Napoleonic Codes enacted between 18o3 and i8io in France have
had the widest influence on modern codification. Indeed, the
codes of the whole of Latin Europe and of Central and Southern
America are largely based on them, as are the codes of Louisiana,
Lower Canada, Belgium and Holland.
Prior to the enactment of these codes in France the law was
customary and varied in different portions of the country. These
customary rules of law had been digested and compared, and the
French lawyers, trained to deal with them, had paved the way
for the codification which followed. Especially the writings of
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Pothier had furnished the foundation for much which was later
eifacted in the Code Napoleon. Sir Courtenay Ilbert says :'
"Of the causes which made for codification in France at
the beginning of this century, the most important were probably three. In the first place, a strong sense of the practical
evils which arose from diversity of laws, coupled with a passionate desire for national unity. In the next place, the continuous efforts of many successive generations of statesmen and
lawyers, all tending in the same direction, all aiming, consciously
or unconsciously, at the same ideal. And lastly, the fact that
the common law of part of the country was wholly, that of the
other part largely, based on law which had already been systematized."
In Germany the same development may be observed,
although at a later period. The various German states even after
the creation of the Empire had each its own system of law; and
of these, Dr. Schuster, writing in 1896, said: 2
"There are therefore six general systems of law, but only
two out of these, the system of the French and that of the Saxon
code, are exclusive systems; the other systems are broken into
by local laws and customs. . . . The result is that in every
case which arises in Germany, the following questions must be
asked: Is there any Imperial statute? Is there any local modem
statute? Is the subject affected by older legislation? What
local law governs it?"
It was largely to remedy this condition of affairs that the
Commercial code was first enacted in Germany, and, later, the
Civil code extended generally over the Empire a uniformity of
law which previously had been confined to commercial matters.
The evils of diversity of law which have afflicted France
and Germany may in some respects have been worse than those
which we find in the United States. Whatever our differences of
law may be, the main-stream is, with slight exception, the samethe Common law of England, which is the source of all our law,
excepting the slight infusion of the Civil law which still persists
in the territory obtained by the Louisiana purchase and the
Mexican war. Nevertheless, the situation is not pleasant to con-

'Legislative Methods and Forms, p. I5.
'92 Law Quarterly Review, 17-34.
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template, for a nation which prides itself upon being a practical
people, of the varying rules of law which our system of State
and National governments have given us. Nor is the remedy
which could be applied in France and Germany of a national
codification open to us. We must seek, through State legislation,
to obtain such uniformity as is possible.
The second advantage which I have suggested for such
partial codification as the Commissioners are attempting may be
more clearly understood if we consider for a moment the volume
of the present sources of our law; for existing conditions furnish
an argument for the passage of uniform laws at once both
because of the desirability of preventing further crystalization of
differences in State jurisdiction, and also the desirability of stating, so far as may be possible, in brief form rules of law which
at present can only be found by searching through many volumes.
For the purpose of showing bulk of the existing sources of
the law, I have had a rough count made of existing American
Law Reports. In order to show more fully whither we are tending, and the rate at which we are going, I have also had a count
made of the volumes which contain the American Case law
decided until about the end of 1885. The count has not been
minutely careful and is doubtless subject to slight inaccuracies,
but it is sufficient for purposes of comparison.
I should add that I have not included duplicate or collateral
reports. The Reporter system, the Lawyers Reports Annotated
and other collateral series largely increase the number of books
which a law library must possess; but it may be said that they do
not increase the bulk of the sources of the law.
I find that there are at the present time something over eight
thousand six hundred American law reports. In 1885-86 there
were a little over three thousand five hundred. This growth,
whether stated as one of over five thousand volumes or as one of
one hundred and fifty per cent. in less than thirty years, is a
formidable matter; thirty -ears is not a long period of time in
the life of a state or nation.
When the examination is turned to individual States the
situation is even more strikihg. It might be thought that the
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great increase in the number of reports was due chiefly to the
admission of new States to the Union, and to the rapid growth
of population and accompanying litigation in States which were
undeveloped thirty years ago. To some extent this is true.
In the earlier years Washington Territory and the State of
Washington had between them five reports, they now have
eighty-two; Oregon, which had thirteen volumes, now has thirtyseven; Nebraska, which had eighteen volumes, now has one hundred. But the growth in the Middle States and in the larger
Eastern States is quite as noticeable. In Illinois the increase is
from one hundred and twenty-six volumes to four hundred and
fifty two; in Missouri, from one hundred and two volumes to
four hundred and thirty-two; in New York, with its multitude
of irregular reports, as well as its large regular series, the number
has risen from five hundred and eighty-six to twelve hundred and
nine; in Pennsylvania, including the periodical publications,
which include decisions of its county courts and other local tribunals, the number has increased from one hundred and fortyeight volumes to seven hundred and thirty-six.
What does this mean? In the first place it means that the
sources of the American law are extremely bulky; that the maintenance of a library from which that law can adequately be surveyed has become a matter of vast expense. It is not a great
many years since individual lawyers might hope to own a library
which contained substantially the whole case law of England and
the United States. That time has passed and the time is also
passing when most cities and counties can hope to have libraries
approximately adequate to ascertain the law even of their own
States; for the decisions of other States may on many points be
necessary to determine the law of a particular State.
Another consequence of the increasing bulk of our Reports
is that each State is developing a jurisprudence of its own which
tends to become more and more independent of the law of other
States. When the Supreme Court of a State has filled two or
three hundred volumes of reports with its decisions, authority of
some sort on most questions of law which are likely to arise may
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be found in them. It becomes less often necessary to search
reports of other States.
It may be thought that this tendency serves to counteract
the difficulties arising from the bulk of our sources. Seven hundred volumes of Reports are a good many, but if the Pennsylvania lawyer may discard decisions of lower courts and can find
most of his problems answered in the Reports of the higher courts
of his own State, why need he be troubled because the courts of
other States are producing a multitude of decisions from month
to month? To some extent undoubtedly the individual problem
is made easier in this way, but the necessity of reference to Reports of other States is not wholly avoided. The possibility
vhich frequently exists that decisions outside of the State may
be of vital consequence makes the examination of such decisions
necessary much oftener than where the results of the examination actually prove important.
Furthermore, in so far as each jurisdiction becomes a law
unto itself, it intensifies the evil .of diversity of law. If the
whole country could look to the same common law, the probability that New York and Ohio might have the same rule on a
given matter as Pennsylvania is far greater than when Pennsylvania, New York and Ohio each looks only to its own decisions
to find the governing principle.
It may be urged, however, that the statutes themselves have
shown astonishing increase in volume, and that one of the recognized and crying evils of the times is the vast legislative output
of statutes each year. This is true, but it is not the number of
statutes so much as the kind of statutes which is the real evil.
Statutes which create new and unnecessary rules of law are a
burden. Statutes which successfully reduce to briefer compass
laws already existing are a gain, and it is in the latter class that
the uniform commercial acts may fairly be classified.
The final advantage of these partial codifications which I
have mentioned-lharmonizing and unifying a subject is one upon
which stress may justly be laid, but I will not dwell on it at this
point, since what I shall say later of the Partnership Act will
serve at once as an argument and an illustration.
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It has been said 3 that the chief motive power leading to
codification on the Continent of Europe has been the impulse of
national unity and the practical inconveniences of the co-existence
of different systems of law in a country under the same political
government. This motive power does not exist in England, and
does exist in the United States, if in a less degree than in some
countries of Continental Europe. Nevertheless, England from
a mere desire to improve the form of English law has made some
advance in reducing the Common law to the form of statute,
especially on commercial subjects. The first important statute
of -the kind passed by Parliament was the Bill of Exchange Act
enacted in 1882; the next was the Partnership Act passed in i8o,
and the third, the Sale of Goods Act passed in 1893. The first
and the last of these were drawn by Sir M. D. Chalmers; the
Partnership Act was drawn by Sir Frederick Pollock. All of
these statutes have operated successfully in England, and
all have diminished in large measure the labor of determining
the law. On most questions it is easier to obtain an answer to
a question in the law of negotiable paper, sales or partnership,
from the brief annotated statutes prepared by the authors of these
Acts, than it previously was to obtain such an answer from the
large treatises which have in a great measure been rendered unnecessary. Difficult questions, of course, arise which are not
readily answered by examination of the statutes, but, as Sir Frederick Pollock says:
"It is not to be supposed that difficult cases can be abolished,
or to any great extent made less difficult, by this or any other
codifying measure. But since difficult cases are after all the
minority, perhaps it is of some importance for men of business
to be enabled to see for themselves the principles applicable to
easy ones."
The history of the English Partnership Act is thus stated
by Sir Frederick Pollock in the preface of his annotated edition
to the Act:
"In 1879 I drafted a Bill intended, first, to codify the
general law of partnership; secondly, to authorize and regulate
the formation of private partnerships with limited liability,
•Ilbert: Legislative Methods ani! Forms, p. x6o.
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corresponding to the socit6 en commandite of Continental law;
and, thirdly, to establish universal and compulsory registration
of firms. The two latter objects were those which my clients
at that time were most bent on. Subsequent experience has
shown, I think, that there is not much real demand or need for
either innovation. The registration part was dropped in i88o
as a condition of the general approval of the Board of Trade.
In 1882 the Bill made so much way as to be reported by a
Select Committee, which, however, declined to proceed with.
the limited partnership scheme. After being again introduced
several times without reaching the stage of effectual debate,
the Bill was, in 1888 and 1889, further considered by the Board
of Trade and the Attorney-General with a view to its adoption
by Ministers. In i89o it was introduced by the Lord Chancellor in the House of Lords, and there revised by a Select Committee, which made various changes in the arrangement of the
sections and a certain number of amendments. The Bill passed
through the House of Commons with a few further amendments, due partly to Sir R. Webster, then Attorney-General,
and partly to Sir Horace [now Lord] Davey, became law, and
came into operation on January i, i89z."
In 1907 another act provided for limited partnerships.
The English Partnership Act, like the English codifications
of the law of Bills and Notes, and of Sales, is an attempt at an
exact restatement of the English case law. No improvement
in that law is attempted, the object being apparently to furnish a
concise and exact statement which will make the labor of lawyers
easier, and will in many cases enable business men to determine,
without consulting lawyers, what the law may be. Great as are
the evils of the conflict of authority in the United States, due to
the numerous independent jurisdictions, this conflict has given to
the American Commercial Acts (which have been based on the
English models) a distinct superiority to them. In England,
whatever is decided becomes the law; and no matter, though the
decision may be inharmonious with general principles, the codifier has felt bound to accept the result. In the United States the
decisions of no single State are taken as the model. The draftsman is not primarily seeking to reform the law, but in attempting to weld a uniform and coherent whole from decisions of fifty
States he necessarily discards local decisions which are inharmonious with the general principles of his subject. He can do
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this safely because he is sure to find decisions which support him.
If in all the jurisdictions of the countty there is none which takes
the viev which seems to him sound, he is pretty safe in attributing his own view to personal idiosyncrasy.
The American statutes have had another advantage over the
English models, because they have been drawn later and the
American draftsmen have had the English statutes as models
from which they could take whatever seemed helpful, and discard or improve upon the rest. Moreover, the American statutes
have probably had a longer and more thorough examination by a
great number of competent persons, other than the draftsmen,
than has been the case with the English statutes.
Certainly if it be conceded that it is possible and desirable
to codify the law of partnership, or any other branch of the law,
all will agree that no pains should be spared to secure the most
scientific and exact statement of the law, and to this end expert
talent, long study, and criticism are essential.
The Commissioners on Uniform Laws may fairly claim
that in the framing of all laws which they have recommended
for enactment these principles have been carefully observed.
Years have been spent in the drafting of all the important Acts,
and in most of them numerous tentative drafts have been'prepared and submitted for the successive criticism of a Committee
of the Commissioners, of the Commissioners as a body, and of the
outside public. In none of the recommended Acts, however, has
the same degree of time, care, and expert criticism been expended
as on the Partnership Act.
The late Dean Ames submitted various draft acts, and on
his death in I9io, his work was taken up by Dean Lewis, the
draftsman of the present Act. In every year since i9io at least
one revision of the proposed Act has been prepared and carefully examined and criticised. If careful work by able lawyers
who have made themselves experts in this subject can produce a
satisfactory statute, every confidence should be felt in the final
draft recommended by the Commissioners. That every expert
will agree on every point with the results reached is of course
impossible, but that the Act is a careful and intelligently drawn
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codification of the subject, far superior to the English Code, both
in substance and expression, is not open to reasonable doubt.
There is perhaps no considerable subject in the law in which
a single fundamental but disputed principle makes so marked a
difference in the conclusions reached, as is the case in the law of
partnership. Very many of the troublesome questions involved
in that branch of the law depend for their answer on whether
what is called the entity theory of partnership, or the so-called
aggregate theory be adopted.
Under the entity theory the partnership is a legal person
distinct from the members of the firm. Many of the principles
of the law of corporations become applicable and, indeed, the
law of partnership would logically become a branch of the law
of corporations if this theory were adopted and consistently followed.
Under the aggregate theory, on the other hand, the partners
are joint owners of the partnership property, and joint obligors
and obligees of claims due from or to the partnership, though
some modifications of the ordinary rules of joint ownership may
be necessary because of the particular character of partnership
business.
The entity theory has commended itself to not a few experts,
notably to the late Dean Ames. The simplicity of the principle
and the certainty of the results are unquestionable advantages.
The coimon law theory of joint rights and duties, and of joint,
ownership of property, is at best a technical and difficult subject.
It does not become any less so when the special incidents of partnership are introduced into the case; and it may be urged further
on behalf of the entity theory that the law of partnership on the
Continent of Europe is based on this theory; and that the subject
of partnership is a more troublesome one under the English law
than under the Continental law where the entity theory prevails.
On the other hand, however, it is to be said that we can not
escape from our past legal history satisfactorily by a legislative
fiat. We may trim and pare excrescences, and may on new subjects create wholly new legal ideas by statute, but in subjects with
a long past, experience seems to show that it is difficult to adopt
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fundamentally new ideas. That the English and American law
has substantially grown up on what has been called the aggregate
theory can hardly be doubted by an impartial student. Results
doubtless have been reached, not infrequently, which cannot be
satisfactorily explained by the aggregate theory; and statements
may be found in judicial opinions that a partnership is an entity,
but these are the exception, not the rule.
Moreover, there are special difficulties in the United States
in declaring a partnership a legal persofi. Our States have numberless statutory and constitutional provisions in regard to corporations. That some of these provisions would be applicable
to partnerships, if partnerships were a legal entity, seems probable. Unexpected and perhaps unfortunate consequences might
follow.
Moreover, if a partnership is to be treated as a quasicorporation, some system of registration of partnership names
and of the members of partnerships seems necessary. If the law
is to create new legal persons distinct from the individuals which
form them, it must in some way keep track of those persons and
define them. Actual persons make themselves sufficiently obvious to the public to make it unnecessary to register them, and so
long as actual persons are treated as the owners of partnership
property, and as the obligors and obligees of partnership rights,
registration is unnecessary.
Dean Ames recognized the necessity of registration and provided in substance in the last draft of the Partnership Act which
he prepared, that every partnership must file in the office of the
Secretary of State a certificate stating the name of the partnership, the riature of. its business, and the name and residence of
each partner. On every change of partnership a new certificate
is required and no partnership was to be allowed to begin or
maintain an action on account of partnership transactions until
the prescribed certificate had been filed. Such a provision would
not be wholly effective or satisfactory. If the record provided
for is to be a final statement of the facts contained in it, there
cannot be secret or dormant partners. Moreover, it would be
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difficult as matter of fact, even with the penal provision suggested, to secure full registration.
But perhaps the most serious objection to the entity theory
as a universal principle is its effect upon the rights of creditors.
On that theory a creditor's only direct right is against the partnership as such. Any attempt to reach the assets of the individual partner can be made only indirectly by holding him as a contributory to the partnership. The natural means of enforcing
such a liability would be by getting judgment first against the
partnership, and, on inability to satisfy the judgment from firm
assets, to bring a bill in equity or analogous proceeding against
the partnership and the individual partner for the purpose of
reaching an asset of the firm which could not be reached by ordinary legal process. It seems probable that when persons in England and America deal with a partnership they do not understand
that they are dealing with a company or fictitious entity like a
corporation, but they understand that they are dealing directly
with individuals and in reliance upon individual as well as collective responsibility.
To these reasons for choosing the aggregate theory may be
added another practical reason, which is largely based on the
reasons already given: Lawyers are distrustful and, as they
believe, rightfully distrustful of attempts to change the law root
and branch. The mere fact that a proposed act would fundamentally change the legal ideas which have generally been entertained in regard to partnership, would make the law difficult of
passage. The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws are seeking as the great reform at which they aim-uniformity-and
they cannot sacrifice this object in an attempt to re-write the law
in a form which it has never taken in English-speaking countries.
Furthermore, however successful a proposed act may be,
as a practical matter the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
must expect, that if it is passed by some States; it will not be
passed by others, and they must foresee that for a long period
there are likely to be many States which will not adopt the proposed law. If then the law itself is widely different from the
common law, the passage of the act in the States which first
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enacted it will diminish instead of increase uniformity. It may,
under some circumstances, be necessary to advocate legislation
which will create a wide variance between the laws of those States
which adopt the legislation, and those States which .donot.. But
other things being equal, or anywhere nearly equal, it is certainly
better to follow the general current of the common law.
An extreme illustration of the difficulty of introducing
wholly new principles in the law of partnership may be found by
considering the provisions of the bafikruptcy law. Under the
bankruptcy law the old rule of distribution-joint assets primarily to joint creditors, and separate assets primarily to separate creditors is enacted. If the entity theory should be
consistently followed in the Uniform Act, the provisions would
be that joint assets went to joint creditors, and individual creditors acquired no right unless after paying all joint creditors there
remained an excess. In that case the excess would be distributed
among the partners' estates as the equities between the partners
might require, and thus would become part of the separate
estates and applicable to the partners' individual debts. But the
rights of the partnership creditors would not be confined to the
firm assets. The firm as a separate entity would have a right
for any deficiency in its assets as compared with its liabilities
against the individual partnership estates as contributories and
could prove this claim in competition and on an equality with
the individual creditor. Whether such a system of distribution
is intrinsically better or worse than that provided by the Bankruptcy Act is immaterial. A provision in a State act for distributing partnership assets in a fundamentally different way
from that provided in the Federal Act would necessarily and
rightly prevent the adoption of the proposed State statute. The
gubstantial rights of the parties could not be made to depend upon
whether the partnership was thrown into bankruptcy or the business liquidated without bankruptcy proceedings.
But though the entity theory as a logically consistent theory
is not followed in the Uniform Partnership Act, the main advantages of that theory are nevertheless attained; the chief reason
for the popularity of the entity view is that it avoids certain
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difficulties into which the common law has floundered in dealing
with the partnership property, especially with reference to
creditors.
The two principal difficulties in the administration of partnership law under existing decisions arise from:
i. The right of a partner as joint owner in specific partnership property; and,
2. The settlement of the claims of different classes of creditors when the business is continued but the personnel of the partnership changes.
In the Uniform Partnership Act the first difficulty is solved,
not by asserting that the partnership as an entity owns the specific
property, but by treating the partners as holding the property by
a special kind of tenancy-tenancy in partnership, and defining
the incidents of that tenancy in such a way as to meet the difficulties of the problem. Joint tenancy and its incidents were
doubtless created by custom, and by the courts, to meet the practical necessities that were felt in co-ownership of feudal estates.
Difficulties have arisen in the law of partnership by trying to fit
the incidents of a kind of co-ownership which arose out of different conditions into the situation which arises in partnership.
By giving appropriate incidents to tenancy in partnership the
draftsman of the act has avoided possibilities of confusion and
impractical results, without making a fundamental change in
existing law.
Thus the interest of a partner in a specific piece of property
belonging to the firm is not subject to attachment in the Uniform
Act, nor can a partner assign his interest in such a piece of property except in connection with an assignment of rights of all the
partners in that property.
The second difficulty in the administration of partnership
law has been met by recognizing the fact that a business may be
a single and continuing business though aq additional member of
the firm may be taken in or one of the original members dropped
out. The act provides that when a business is continued without
liquidation, though the personnel of the firm conducting the business may change, all the creditors of the different partnerships
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are creditors of the partnership which continues the business and
all have an equal right in the property embarked in the business.
Under the existing law that property belongs to the last firm,
which results in extreme hardship to the creditors who have
extended credit before the last change in the personnel of the
firm. Courts have endeavored to modify this hardship by declar-ing in many cases that the transfer of the property to tile last
finn was in fraud of the creditors of the preceding firm. The
resulting practical situation has been one of extreme doubt where
it has been hitherto and it still is extremely difficult to determine
the rights of the various creditors.
Minor difficulties" also in the application of the aggregate
theory have been met. At -common law a partner could not
convey land or execute any sealed instrument without authority
under seal from the other partners. This is changed by giving
a partner implied power to execute any instrument appropriate
to the business of the firm.
Onl a few subjects in the law uniformity, unless complete,
accomplishes little. Thus if one State has laws permitting the
formation of corporations with any capitalization without regard
to the value of the corporate property an injury is wrought to all
the States which cannot be remedied by the fact that nearly all
the States have adequate laws on the subject.
So in the law of marriage and divorce, a single plague spot
is enough to infect the whole country. One Reno is sufficient
to accommodate the inhabitants of many States. But in commercial laws every approach to uniformity is a gain, and if a
number of adjoining States enact the laws recommended by the
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, they provide themselves with rules which will cover uniformly most cases
which arise. The fact that one or two jurisdictions have not yet
passed the Negotiable Instruments Law has practically no effect
outside of those States. Business cannot migrate to them for
the purposes of avoiding the application of the uniform law. It
is therefore no argument against the passage of the proposed
uniform laws that it is very difficult and perhaps almost -impossible to secure their passage in every State. On the other hand,
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as each new State enacts one of these laws, it is a strong argument in favor of its passage by other States. This argument in
Pennsylvania is a strong one at the present time for the passage
of the Uniform Sales Act. That act has been enacted on every
side of Pennsylvania. New Jersey, New York, Ohio and Maryland have all enacted it, and the statute has now been in force in
several jurisdictions for seven or eight years, and no difficulties
have arisen in its administration or construction.
I venture to read in closing some editorial remarks of the
Central Law Journal for December Iith which have come to
my attention while I was preparing this address, What the
writer says in regard to a single disputed question in the law of
sales may, it is hoped, be said equally well of many of the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act, and of the other
uniform statutes on commercial law which the Commissioners
have recommended for enactment.
"What an excellent thing it would seem to be to have all
questions as to which courts are so greatly at variance, in construing the Statute of Frauds, settled by uniforn-adjudication
throughout this land. If the labors of the Commission on
Uniform State Laws accomplished nothing more than to do away
with conflicting decision regarding the 4 th and 17th sections
of the Statute of Frauds, it should feel well repaid. Statuteof-Frauds legislation in the various states has generally been
regarded as statutory declarations of the old law, and construction thereof have followed old lines. In the Sales Act,
however, provisions are unified and simplified, and their clearness seems to leave little room for diversity of application." I
Samuel Williston.
HarvardLaw School.
'79 Cent. L. J. 422 (December ix,

1914).

